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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
BARBARA J. WARREN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ROBERT L. WARREN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---0000000---
REPL Y BRIEF 
Case No. 17514 
Appellant Barbara J. Warren submits the following Reply Brief 
in order to demonstrate certain factual errors contained within the 
brief of respondent Robert L. Warren and to respond to new issues raised 
in that Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his Brief, !\tr. Warren grossly overstates the income 
available to Appellant. Beginning with the second paragraph of his 
Statement of Facts (Resp. Br. at 3), Mr. Warren insistently claims that 
~!rs. Warren has available to her "a gross monthly income of $1,800." He 
calculates this amount as being the sum of $800 per month from her trust 
(inherited from her father), the $400 per month short-term alimony 
awarded by the trial court, and "$600 per month in stock dividends from 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shares of National Bancshares stock". There is absolutely no evidence 
in the Record to support any finding that ~.1rs. Warren receives $600 per 
month in stock dividends on top of her trust income. In fact, these 
bank shares have produced, at most, $600 per year. (Exhibit 32-P and 
R. at 575-581, Tr. at 201-207.) 
Moreover, Mr. Warren claims in his brief (Resp. Br. at 4) that 
!\frs. Warren's inheritance amounted to only $66,386.01 at the time of her I 
marriage. The unrefuted testimony at the trial was, however, that 
Mrs. Warren inherited approximately $200, 000. CR. at 416, Tr. at 42.) 
This inheritance was comprised of savings accounts, stocks, life 
insurance policies, and a rental lot. (_!!:!. ). It was from these 
inherited funds that the parties purchased their first home in 1954 and 
a second home in 1969. (R. at 432, Tr. at 58.) The downpayment ontt; 
second home was $48, 500 and was provided solely from funds withdrawn 
from Mrs. Warren's inheritance. (_!!:!.) Eventually, the sales proceeds 
from this second home were used to create substantial equity in the 
parties' present residence. It was also Mrs. Warren's inheritance that 
made possible the publication of Mr. Warren's book, "Utah's Biggest 
Bucks". CR. at 438, Tr. at 64.) In short, as Mr. Warren acknowledges 
1 in his Brief, !\1rs. Warren was compelled during the tenure of this 
marriage to contribute well in excess of $146, 000 from her inheritance, 
2 l 
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much of which was used to provide the necessities of life, including 
food, shelter, and utilities. 
In attempting to justify the imposition upon Mrs. Warren of 
more than two-thirds of the parties' outstanding obligations, Mr. Warren 
asserts that these were charge card debts for which he was not 
responsible. (Resp. Br. at 21.) In so doing, Mr. Warren conveniently 
overlooks in his Brief that which he admitted in his testimony. At 
trial, he admitted that the obligations to Valley Bank and Trust 
consisted of "check protection" advances to cover checking account 
overdrafts. (R. at 572, Tr. at 198.) Ur. Warren further insists in his 
brief that his pension and profit sharing, retirement and ESOP plans are 
unavailable to him until retirement and as such have no present value. 
However, they are available at the termination of his employment with 
E-Systems, which has occured in connection with his attempt to enter a 
void and prohibited marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RESPONDENT GROSSLY OVERSTATES THE 
ACTUAL INCOME AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT. 
Through some mathematical hocus-pocus, Mr. Warren attempts in 
his Brief to demonstrate that Mrs. Warren actually has available to her 
monthly income of $1, 800. As noted in the Statement of Facts, above, 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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this assertion is based, in part, upon the fallacious assur:iption that 
Mrs. Warren receives $600 per r:ionth in dividends on bank stock. The!' 
is no evidence to support that assumption. Moreover, the supposed 
$1, 800 per month includes $400 per month in short-term alimony, which 
will be discontinued in less than three years. In fact, the evidence 
presented at trial was that in 1979 Mrs. Warren's National Bancshares 
generated interest income for the year of $568.40 and her trust 
generated interest and dividends of $7 ,479.69 for a total gross income 
of $8, 048. 09 or $670. 67 per month. (Exhibit 32-P.) Also, as 
!'.1rs. Warren has been required to expend the principal of her trust to 
pay debts (such as one-half of approximately $5, 000 in 1979 federal 
taxes, as ordered by Judge Leary), the monthly income from the legacy 
has actually been further diminished. 
Respondent then unfairly compares the supposed pre-tax $1,8~~ 
per month (which is actually never more than $1, 100 per month and will 
drop to a paltry $700 per month in less than three years) with his 
after-tax net income. (Resp. Br. at 24.) Mr. Warren carefully refrains 
from mentioning that he actually has a gross income of in excess of 
$40,000 per year. (R. at 562, Tr. at 188.) This amount does not 
include bonuses, fringe benefits, and stock options, all of which have 
been of considerable value to Mr. Warren in the past. 
In actuality, a fair comparison indicates that !\1r. Warren has 
monthly net income substantially in excess of $3, 300 while Mrs. Warren 
4 
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has monthly income (at the present time) of less than $1, 100, which will 
drop to $700 in the near future. In view of the fact that !\1r. Warren 
was able to obtain a professional education by relying upon his wife's 
inheritance and is now a lucratively employed professional while his 
wife is a 49-year-old housewife and mother who has not been gainfully 
employed in the last quarter century and has no marketable skills 
whatsoever, the alimony awarded by the trial court is so insufficient as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
As this Court has frequently recognized, it is the necessary 
function of alimony to provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. For 
example, this Court noted in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), that: 
The function of alimony is to provide support for 
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. 
Criteria considered in determining a reasonable 
award of support include the financial conditions 
and needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to 
provide a sufficient income for herself, and the 
ability of the husband to provide support. 
615 P.2d at 1223 (footnote citation omitted). In this case, Mr. Warren 
has the demonstrated ability to provide a lucrative income. On the 
other hand, Mrs. Warren, who is now almost 50 years of age, has no 
employable skills and has not been employed in the past quarter century. 
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.., 
Both factors militate strongly in favor of a substantial alimony award. 
In view of the long duration of the marriage, a long-term alimony award 
is not only appropriate but essential to an equitable decree. 
Similarly, in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 
Court observed that the function of alimony 
1979). th,I 
I 
is to provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage • • • Important criterin 
determining a reasonable award for support and 
maintenance are the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife, considering her station in life; her 
ability to produce sufficient income for herself; 
and the ability of her husband to provide 
support. 
587 P.2d 147 (footnote citation omitted). Likewise, in Wilson v. 
Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), this Court, faced with a 
15-year marriage, held that: 
The court's responsibility is to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of [the 
parties'] economic resources so that the parties 
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful 
basis. In doing so, it is necessary for the court 
to consider • • • an appraisal of all of the 
attendant facts and circumstances; the duration of 
the marriage; the ages of the parties; their social 
positions and standards of living; their health; 
considerations relative to children; the money and 
property they possess and how it was acquired; 
their capabilities and training and their present 
and potential incomes. 
296 P.2d at 979-80 (footnote citation omitted). Again, each of these 
factors demands a substantial and long-term award of alimony in view of 
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the length of this marriage, the employability of Mrs. Warren, and the 
demonstrated earning potential of Mr. Warren. 
A similarly long-term marriage was before this Court in 
llacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). This Court 
articulated several factors to be considered in determining alimony: 
(1) The social position and standard of living of 
each before the marriage • 
(2) The respective ages of the parties [at the 
time of the marriage.] 
(3) What each may have given up for the marriage 
(4) What money or property each brought into the 
marriage •••• 
(6) The relative ability, training and education 
of the parties • • 
(7) The duration of the marriage 
(8) The present income of the parties and the 
property acquired during the marriage • • 
(14) Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care 
which may have been given to the spouse or others 
(15) The present standards of living and needs of 
each including the cost of living • • 
236 P. 2d at 1070. Application of these factors to the present case 
clearly demonstrates the necessity of a substantial alimony award in 
favor of Mrs. Warren. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Warren had 
7 
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little education and little earning power. As a result of Mrs. Warren's 
financial abilities, he was able to obtain a professional education and 
dramatically increase his earning potential. It was ~1rs. Warren who 
brought into the marriage over $200, 000 worth of property, which has 
been relied upon heavily by the parties during the marriage, literally 
to provide food and shelter. This was a long-term marriage of almost 
thirty-years' duration. The present earning capabilities of the parties 
reflect their sacrifices and achievements during the marriage: 
Mrs. Warren, who remained at home, raising a family and caring for the 
home, has no employable skills; whereas Mr. Warren, who financed a 
professional education through his wife's inheritance, now has a 
lucrative job and enjoys substantial earning capabilities. The parties' 
most substantial assets (the home and its furnishings) were acquired 
with Mrs. Warren's inheritance. It was her inheritance that was used to I 
make a substantial downpayment on the parties' second home, the proceed!! 
from the sale of which were used to purchase their present home. It is ! 
Mrs. Warren's inherited antiques and furnishings that have furnished the 
present home. Equally important, it was Mrs. Warren who supported the 
household and provided her husband with an education, both of which 
permitted Mr. Warren to amass a considerable sum in investments, all of 
which were awarded to him. 
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The modest and very short-term alimony awarded by the trial 
court, particularly when taken together with the property distribution 
effected, constitutes an abuse of discretion and a gross injustice to 
\!rs. Warren. 
POINT 11. THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION EFFECTED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT IS INEQUITABLE. 
In an attempt to justify an inequitable distribution of the 
parties' properties, Mr. Warren relies upon grossly inflated values. 
His testimony, accepted by the trial court, was almost $20, 000 above the 
highest amounts testified to by his "experts". The values established 
by these "experts" were, however, not fair market values, but 
replacement cost values. The replacement cost of an item is not an 
accurate indicator of its value or worth. When the question is the 
fairness of the distribution of the parties' properties, it is not 
relevant how much it would cost either party to replace the property. 
What is relevant is the actual value of the property; that is to say 
what is the actual worth of the property received by each of the 
parties. The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the property 
awarded to I\1rs. Warren on the basis of the replacement cost of those 
items. 
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The trial court also abused its discretion in failing to 
reimburse Mrs. Warren for her tremendous contributions to the assets 
acquired during the marriage. This Court has, in domestic relations 
actions, long recognized and adhered to the principle that logic and 
equity both compel restoration or reimbursement to a spouse for value 
brought into the marriage, whether from pre-marital sources or 
inheritances. For example, in Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31, 
184 P. 2d 670 (1947), this Court was faced with the dissolution of a 
relatively short-term marriage between older persons. The major asset 
of the parties was a home, which had been purchased shortly after their 
marriage. The evidence demonstrated that while the husband had 
purchased the residence, the wife had made significant contibutions from 
her pre-marital funds. The trial court awarded the house exclusively to 
the husband. In reversing this decision, this Court observed: 
The [husband] testified that he paid the original 
purchase price [for the home], but the testimony of 
[the wife] shows that some of her funds were used 
for remodeling the house, and that she did 
considerable work to aid in the improvement of the 
property to make the house liveable. 
184 P.2d at 672. Based upon these facts, this Court held that the trial 
court had erred in not properly reimbursing both spouses for their 
respective contributions to the marital estate: 
We think that a more equitable division of the 
property than made below is suggested by the 
10 
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! 
record, whereby [the wife] would receive the 
benefit of the value which she contributed to the 
realty. The value of the real estate should 
therefore be determined and [the wife] should be 
awarded one-half of the market value in excess of 
the original price; and [the husband] should be 
permitted either to pay [the wife] one-half of such 
enhanced value retain the property, or the property 
should be sold under court order and after reim-
bursing [the husband] for the amount of the 
original purchase price which he testified that he 
paid, the balance, after deducting the costs of 
sale, should be divided equally. 
Id. (emphasis added). In the present action, the trial court wholly 
overlooked the fact that the parties' equity in their present home was 
attributable in large measure to the payment against its purchase price 
of the proceeds from the parties' second home in Texas. The very 
substantial downpayment on that home had been made solely from 
\!rs. Warren's inherited funds. 
More recently, the same principle was applied by this Court in 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697 (Utah 1974). Before the court in that 
case was a long-term marriage between relatively young parties. 
Nevertheless, this Court again articulated and approved the principle 
that the spouses' respective contributions to the marital estate should 
be reimbursed before the ultimate division of the property. The trial 
court in Searle found that the husband had brought to the marriage real 
and personal property with an aggregate value of approximately $50,000. 
The trial court then proceeded to award to the husband "assets 
11 
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equivalent in value to the $50, 000 that he owned at the time of the 
I 
marriage." 522 P. 2d at 698. On appeal, this Court found that the trial j 
court had acted properly and affirmed the property distribution 
fashioned by the trial court. 522 P.2d at 700. 
In Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 0973), 
Court again noted that "the source of the assets" was one of the factors 
to be take into consideration in effecting a property distribution. In 
that case, substantially all of the assets had come from gifts from the 
wife's family; however, it was throur,h the husband's "careful and 
prudent investment" of those assets that the parties' substantial estate 
was developed. Even though in that case (directly contrary to the case 
now before this Court) it was the husband's talents that had caused the 
assets contributed by the wife to increase dramatically in value, this 
Court held that it was appropriate to award approximately two-thirds of 
the marital property to the wife. A fortiori in a case such as the 
present where the husband's talents have not been used to obtain an 
increase in the inherited property, the trial court must be particularly 
careful to restore to the wife her contributions from inherited 
property. Merely awarding to ~1rs. Warren (as the trial court did) the 
remaining principal of her inheritance does nbt reimburse her for the 
vast amounts she has contributed to the marriage. The trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to award to ~1rs. Warren additional 
12 
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al 
h: 
property to compensate her for her contributions and then compounded 
that error by utilizing grossly inflated replacement cost values 
proffered by the husband. 
Most recently, this Court has again emphasized the necessity 
of the reimbursement to a spouse of his or her contribution to the 
marriage from pre-marital assets. In Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 
326 (Utah 1980), this Court first made clear that the major asset of the 
marriage had been acquired with funds brought to the marriage by the 
wife. In fashioning its property distribution, the trial court 
reimbursed to her, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the funds she had 
contributed from pre-marital assets. The trial court then distributed 
the remaining equity in the assets on a percentage basis, with 
approximately three-quarters of the equity going to the wife. On 
appeal, this Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was well 
within its discretion: 
It was not unreasonable for the court to permit 
[the wife] to withdraw from the marital property 
the equivalent of those assets [she] brought into 
the marriage. All that may be considered to be 
marital property acquired through the joint efforts 
of the parties was therefore the proceeds [sic] 
from the sale of the St. George home over and above 
its purchase price [which had been contributed 
exclusively by the wife]. 
610 P. 2d at 328. Having contributed a substantial amount of money to 
this marriage from funds received through inheritances from her family, 
13 
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appellant is entitled to the reimbursement of those funds, together Witt, 
an equitable share of the appreciation in value of those funds and the 
other marital assets. 
In its adherence to the proposition that a spouse is entitled 
to the reimbursement of assets contributed to the marriage, this Court 
is not alone. For example, the Montana Supreme Court recently held in 
1 
Herron v. Herron, 608 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1980), that the trial court had 
seriously abused its discretion in failing to distribute additional 
property to the wife in order to restore to her the substantial 
contributions to the marriage that she had made from funds received as 
gifts and inheritances from her wealthy father. The trial court had 
divided the property equally between the spouses. In reversing this 
distribution, the Montana Supreme Court noted: 
The inequity of the 50 / 50 property 
distribution becomes apparent after 
considering the source of the marital 
assets of the parties. Almost all of the 
property accumulated by the Herrons can 
be traced to gifts or bequests from the 
[wife's father]. 
Given the fact that most of the 
marital assets were accumulatEld via gifts 
from Mrs. Herron's father, [the husband's] 
contributions to the marriage from other 
sources would have to substantially 
outweigh Mrs. Herron's to render equitable 
a 50 / 50 distribution of the couple's 
14 
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assets. 
here •• 
That simply is not the case 
Both of the parties here should share 
equally in the portion of the value of the 
gift property attributable to contribution 
from the marriage and appreciation during 
the marriage. The Herrons should not, 
however, share equally in the total value 
of the property since the marital assets 
came to the marriage principally as gifts 
for Mrs. Herron's benefit. 
608 P. 2d at 100-02 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Montana Supreme 
Court held in Balsam v. Balsam, 589 P.2d 652 (Mont. 1979), that the 
district court had properly reimbursed to the husband funds that he had 
contributed to the marriage from his pre-marital assets. In so holding, 
the Montana Supreme court approved the property distribution fashioned 
by the trial court even though it gave to the wife only $50, 000 from the 
quarter million dollars in assets owned by the parties at the time of 
their divorce. 
In the present case, Mrs. Warren contributed freely to the 
marriage from her substantial inheritances. The trial court has not 
only failed to reimburse her for those contributions, it has compounded 
its error by placing a totally unrealistic value on the property 
distributed to ~1rs. Warren. The trial court blindly accepted 
self-serving values offered by the husband which were both improperly 
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based upon replacement cost and greatly in excess even of the values 
speculatively offered by his own "experts". 
CONCLUSION 
During the tenure of this marriage, which endured for more 
than a quarter century, Mrs. Warren made it financially possible for her 
husband to obtain a professional education. Having provided a fine 
education for her husband, Mrs. Warren remained at home, where she 
dutifully raised their family and kept house. Although she had financea 
a professional education for her husband, she did not have the 
opportunity to gain any employable skills herself. Now, almost 50 years 
of age and with a chronic health problem of her hands, she has been 
compelled by the small and very short-term alimony award of the trial 
court to do that which she has never done before--to seek employment 
order to provide for her support, or to dissipate the legacy which woulO 
have provided for her retirement. 
Such a result is as unfair and inequitable as it is 
unrealistic and unwarranted. This Court has consistently adhered to 
just proposition that it is the function of alimony to support a woman 
at that standard of living to which she has 'become accustomed during 
marriage. Not only has Mrs. Warren not been forced to seek employment' I 
during her marriage, she is now at a stage of life and health where it 
16 
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is unrealistic for her to do so. By failing to recognize and deal with 
these realities, the district court has abused its discretion and 
misapplied Utah law. 
During her marriage, ~.1rs. Warren not only financed an 
education for her husband, but she generously contributed from her 
inheritances from the family finances. It was through her substantial 
contributions of capital that the parties' home was acquired and 
financed and many of the daily expenses were met. The district court 
has failed not only to recognize and reimburse adequately these 
contributions, it has compounded this error through the blind acceptance 
of grossly overstated values proposed by the husband for the property 
actually distributed to Mrs. Warren. The husband's valuation of these 
items is substantially in excess even of the amounts speculatively 
testified to by the so-called "experts" who appeared at trial. More 
fundamentally, even these values were based upon replacement cost of the 
items concerned; no effort was made by any witness--except Mrs. Warren 
herself--to evaluate the property on the basis of its actual present 
market value. In so doing, the trial court has misapplied the law and 
abused its discretion resulting in a property distribution grossly 
unfair to Mrs. Warren. 
This case must be remanded to the district court so that the 
support and property distribution aspects of this divorce action may be 
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properly considered and a decree be entered in accordance with the 
principles so frequently articulated by this Court. 
RESEPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ ~day of March, 1982, 
DART & STEGALL 
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